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On what might a comparative discussion of philosophy of education that  
takes Europe as one of its terms be based? This paper begins by addressing  
the complexity that attaches to the name ‘Europe’ in this context in order to  
lay the way for a more detailed consideration of so-called ‘Continental’ 
philosophy—specifically of poststructuralism. It makes reference to the ways  
in which the work of poststructuralist thinkers has often been interpreted in  
‘postmodern’ educational theory and seeks to reveal certain errors in this  
regard. Distinctions are drawn between postmodernity, postmodernism and 
poststructuralism, illustrating the last of these in terms of two influential  
strands of thought drawn from Levinas and Nietzsche, and indicating their  
value for education. In conclusion, some brief remarks are offered regarding 
the institutionalization of philosophy of education in Europe.
What can this paper be about? Where to begin? There are problems about what Europe 
is, yet reason to believe that it has a unique, defining role in what anyone reading this 
journal is likely to think of as philosophy of education. Certainly there have been 
similar forms of study elsewhere in the world, in wholly different traditions. But if 
‘philosophy of education’ is what we are speaking about, then we cannot think about 
this without some sense of its origins, and, wherever we start from, this will take us 
back inexorably to Europe. Even ‘philosophy’, a word notoriously difficult to translate 
into non-European languages, takes us back to Europe. So there are real problems as to 
how a comparative account taking Europe as one of its terms is feasible.
I propose the following approach. The first section of this article offers a series of 
ways in which ‘Europe’ might be taken, considering it as a modern political 
configuration, as an inheritance, as excluding (or as other to) the UK, and finally in 
terms of the contrast between Continental and analytical styles of philosophy. The 
second section briefly acknowledges some of the main currents of philosophical thought 
that have shaped contemporary philosophy of education before elaborating what is 
connoted by the term ‘Continental’ today. The third section, the major burden of the 
paper, clarifies the ideas of postmodernity, postmodernism and poststructuralism, 
illustrating the last of these in terms of two influential strands of thought. The final 
section makes some brief remarks about the institutionalization of the field in this part 
of the world. This approach may seem roundabout, but it is necessary if meaningful 
comparisons are to be made.
Europe?
What then is Europe? We might think, first, of the modern political configuration, 
membership of which increased on 1 May 2004 from fifteen to twenty-five states. But 
the landmass designated by the name ‘Europe’ is not the same as the political 
organization to which the term commonly applies. The European Union is, so we are 
told on its website, a family of democratic European countries committed to peace and 
prosperity, joined in a unique political relationship:
It is not a State intended to replace existing states, but it is more than any other 
international organisation. The EU is, in fact, unique. Its Member States have set 
up common institutions to which they delegate some of their sovereignty so that 
decisions on specific matters of joint interest can be made democratically at 
European level. This pooling of sovereignty is also called ‘European integration’ 
(Europa, 2004).
Hence the political entity of Europe is, on its own self-definition, diverse, making 
generalizations about it and its academic practices all the more open to question. The 
Union has developed in a context that is itself changing—from its inception in the 
aftermath of the Second World War to its more recent and continuing adjustment to 
postmodernity. In such circumstances ideas of identity and sovereignty are themselves 
compromised by forces of globalization: national and geographical boundaries become 
far less significant and less pertinent to academic practice. Moreover, philosophical 
questions, by their very nature (their generality, their ‘deepness’, their breadth, perhaps 
their universality) tend not to be tied to local policy and practice to the extent that other 
aspects of educational research are. Hence, even where they start from specific 
questions of local policy, they quickly transcend these particular concerns.
The question of what is meant by Europe might prompt us, second, to turn away 
from current political structures and to think in terms of the heritage that it has 
conferred. Once again, geographical boundaries are transcended, for however one 
defines this heritage, and whatever strengths or weaknesses one discerns within it, the 
background of European thought and civilization is commonly understood as the 
backbone of the western tradition. Indeed this very way of thinking of a lineage—this 
arborescent structure, as Deleuze might put this—is very much a product of that 
inheritance.
A third complicating factor over the definition of Europe has to do with a far 
more ethnocentric quirk of the British, one that is captured in the infamous headline 
from The Times newspaper in the days of Empire: ‘Fog in Channel. Europe cut off.’ 
British isolationism has not entirely disappeared! Hence when the topic is European 
philosophy of education and this is being prepared for a British-based journal, the 
default assumption will be that coverage of work going on in the UK is not part of this 
brief.
This distinction feeds into another, between ‘Continental’ and ‘analytical’ 
philosophy—one that in its own way is equally quirky. The distinction is one that has 
divided philosophy departments; and it is one that has left some in philosophy of 
education looking with incredulity and dismay at ‘the other side’ (though this dismay 
usually comes from one direction more than the other). Of course, ‘Continental’ by no 
means covers all the work that goes on in philosophy in Europe, any more than it is 
confined to that region of the world. This is a distinction that applies generally to 
contemporary philosophy (in the western tradition), albeit that the preponderance of 
Anglophone work is analytical. But there is reason to be chary of the distinction—
perhaps no more reasonable, as Bernard Williams remarked, than a classification of cars 
into ‘front-wheel drive’ and ‘Japanese’.
These then are the difficulties facing any attempt to give an account of 
European philosophy of education. They do, however, provide something of a rationale 
for what follows. In their light I now proceed to say something about currents of 
philosophical thought that have shaped contemporary philosophy of education, 
highlighting the Continental. This will perforce involve reference to postmodernism and 
poststructuralism.
The philosophical inheritance of continental philosophy
Any attempt even to outline the main strands of this inheritance in a paper of this length 
comes close to absurdity, but it is difficult to see how some mention, at least, of 
significant thinkers can be avoided. Hence it seems impossible not to include some 
reference to ‘beginnings’ with Plato and Aristotle, with their immeasurable influence—
on metaphysics, ethics, epistemology . . . the very structures of philosophical thought 
that have come down to us. We can perhaps pass by such thinkers as Augustine and 
Aquinas in order to highlight the pivotal figure of Descartes in the shaping of the 
modern consciousness—that is, in laying the way for an understanding of the individual 
that has fed into ethics and epistemology over the past four centuries (on both sides of 
the English Channel). We cannot ignore Rousseau, who, while he must be the most 
familiar philosopher to anyone interested in education, is probably underestimated in 
terms of his importance in shaping modern ways of thinking—our ideas regarding 
childhood and the natural world, of course, but also modern political conceptions of 
freedom and equality. To echo words of Charles Taylor, Rousseau lays the way for our 
understanding of ourselves as beings with inner depths, depths to which reference must 
be made in our assessments of right and wrong and in our sense of our place in the 
world—he provides, in other words, the basis for the characteristically modern value of 
authenticity. The figure of Kant, so much influenced by Rousseau, is pivotal for the 
divergence in philosophy between Anglophone and Continental traditions that is to 
follow, for most philosophers will place themselves somehow or other in relation to 
him. But the way that they read him will be markedly different. To anticipate the 
outcome of the story a little, the idea of rational autonomy in modern analytical 
philosophy of education owes much to Kant, but so too does Lyotard’s understanding of 
the sublime. No understanding of twentieth century French or German philosophy could 
be complete without reference to the legacy of Marx, especially in relation to Critical 
Theory and the work of the Frankfurt School but also in certain respects in Sartre’s 
existentialism, for example, and generally in the climate of thought in France in the 
1950s and 1960s. A more influential figure today, however, is Nietzsche. 
Poststructuralism comes about in part as a complication or unravelling of the 
structuralism of Saussure and Levi-Strauss, but in so doing it draws extensively on the 
influence of Nietzsche. (Nietzsche was influenced by Emerson and Thoreau, and they in 
their turn by Asian thought.)
This somewhat absurd ‘listing’ of names provides no tidy, linear history of 
influence. These are simply pointers to what might be called an inheritance of European 
thought, the beneficiaries of which are to be found all over the world. To reiterate the 
point, geographical boundaries will not suffice as the basis of comparison. Hence, to 
enable a comparison that is significant for philosophy of education, I shall focus 
especially on aspects of poststructuralism. Curtailing the discussion in this way is 
justified insofar as poststructuralism is most commonly identified today with 
Continental philosophy, arbitrary as this may be.
Postmodernism, postmodernity and poststructuralism
In what ways, then, might ideas drawn from poststructuralist thinkers (such as Derrida, 
Foucault, Levinas, Lyotard) have a bearing on the understanding of educational policy 
and practice? Reference to the ‘postmodern’ has become commonplace in educational 
research, but it is problematic in at least two respects. In the first, ‘postmodernism’ has 
become a trendy catchword, used to excess and with a lack of precision by both its 
advocates and its detractors. Things are made worse here by the assumptions that are 
made about what it implies, of which more will be said in the ensuing paragraphs. 
Second, the term is rightly used about a loose and fairly broad range of developments—
in art and literature, film, music and fashion design, in cultural studies as well as 
philosophy itself. Architecture has provided seminal and iconic examples of what 
postmodernism is. There is a problem in applying the term to philosophy, however, in 
that the thinking that has been so influential for postmodernism is not necessarily 
periodized in quite the way that we find in the related developments in art, etc. If it is 
the thinking of Derrida, Foucault, Levinas and Lyotard to which reference is to be made, 
then ‘poststructuralist’ is the more precise and apt expression. At the same time it is 
worth drawing a distinction between postmodernity (as a period in time—characterized 
by information and communication technology (ICT), simulation and virtuality, 
fragmentation and massification, and so on) and postmodernism (as this range of ideas 
and practices influenced by poststructuralism). None of this is to deny that, as a matter 
of fact, the term ‘postmodern educational theory’ has become common in educational 
research, but it is to regret this to the extent that this usage is vague and burdened with 
misleading assumptions. 
Misleading assumptions
Let us begin here by enumerating some of these assumptions—regarding cultural and 
epistemological relativism, personal identity and narrative, language and power—in 
order to show how these diverge from the poststructuralist ideas upon which they claim 
to draw. It is appropriate to consider popular interpretations of these postmodernist 
themes in the light of the criticisms they have attracted and in relation to the 
poststructuralist thinkers with whom they are commonly associated.
In the first place there is the assumption that postmodernism must somehow reject 
the past. The past has been characterised by its false certainties—about God, king, 
country, the rationality of man, progress—all of which are now called into question. In 
fact the possibility of certainty, of truth itself, has been exposed as a chimera, in what 
seems to be a thoroughgoing scepticism (see Standish, 1995). Scepticism about truth 
leads to relativism, of both epistemological and ethical kinds, and in both individual and 
cultural forms. Knowledge claims and the traditions that go with them are then nothing 
more than the expression of power interests, however covert or unwitting these may be. 
What is ‘true’ in one culture (or for one person) is not ‘true’ for another: what is ‘true’ is 
synonymous with what is ‘taken to be true’. So too, ethical standards are relative to 
cultures (or individuals), such that we have no right to criticize what they do (and you 
have no right to pass judgement on the values I hold)—hence the familiar complaints: 
‘Aren’t you being judgemental?’ ‘Aren’t you bringing values in?’
Doubts of these kinds often carry with them a further set of assumptions to the 
effect that, if there can be no certainty and no ethical objectivity to values, then 
ultimately we live in a world without values. (Curiously, the reductive assertion that all 
is power is itself presumed to be somehow innocent of value judgement!) The 
consequence is a prevailing nihilism. Educational research in this vein is often 
characterized by a cynicism bent on exposure of the presumptions and pretensions of 
modernity. Sometimes such assumptions are grafted onto concerns for injustice; 
sometimes they provide the rationale for a commitment to releasing the ‘play’ of 
language and thought—perhaps with suggestion of emancipation.
Manifestations of these tendencies can be seen readily enough in some of the 
exaggerated forms that otherwise potentially coherent kinds of educational research can 
take. Thus, because there is no ultimate truth, ‘constructivism’ takes it that learning is a 
matter of the child creating her own knowledge. Similarly, ‘narrative research’ is 
sometimes understood to involve the creation of one’s life story, or perhaps, because we 
know that what is studied is never independent of the researcher, the construction, 
somewhat narcissistically, of the researcher’s own life-story. (Further confusion arises 
here in the equivocation over ‘story’ as fiction and non-fiction.) As a third example, 
hinted at above, arguments on the part of multiculturalists sometimes lose coherence in 
their pieties of ‘respect for the other’ and their mantra of ‘recognition of difference’.
But if these misleading assumptions involve fallacious readings of 
poststructuralist thought, how are we to move towards a more accurate understanding? 
What are the characteristics of poststructuralism?
Central preoccupations of poststructuralism
Poststructuralism is pervaded by a concern with the relation of language to thought, and 
as such it relates to the so-called linguistic concern of twentieth century philosophy. 
This is a turning of philosophical attention within Anglophone traditions—for example, 
by J. L. Austin and by the later Wittgenstein. It involved moving away from 
foundationalist assumptions of the primacy of logic and towards a more subtle 
recognition of the varied nature of language and of its deep influence, its pervasive 
implication, across the range of human practices. On the Continent such sensitivities 
were already well developed in the work of Nietzsche, who had himself read and been 
impressed by similar thoughts in Emerson and Thoreau. Heidegger’s thinking, in the 
decades following the publication of his masterwork, Being and time [Sein und Zeit] 
(Heidegger, 1927), moved towards the emphasis on language as fundamental to our 
being. Language is not well understood as a means of communication—as if, as 
Aristotle had thought, ideas first exist in some kind of abstract form and then are coded 
into words in order for us to convey them to others. For in what form do those ideas first 
arise? Where do they come from? As Heidegger provocatively puts the matter, man does 
not speak language: language speaks man. Language is the wellspring for our thought 
and our being as human beings. With this disturbance of the relation between thoughts 
and words, the way is opened also to a weakening of the distinction between philosophy 
and literature.
Poststructuralist thought is indeed concerned with the relation of knowledge and 
power. Once again Nietzsche’s writings lay the way for this, especially for the work of 
Foucault. But the point of the power-knowledge connection has less to do with the ways 
in which particular power interests conceal their operations under the cloak of a 
supposedly natural language (though, to be sure, this does happen): it is that any form of 
discourse enables certain ways of thinking even as it (perhaps surreptitiously) excludes 
others. Power, however, is not necessarily bad, and exclusion is inevitable and not 
necessarily to be regretted. One thing that this reveals is the inevitably partial nature of 
our language and thought—the impossibility of a comprehensive or total understanding. 
It should encourage a more subtle and discriminative thought, alert to the effects of 
exclusions as well as appreciative of the possibilities that specific forms of discourse 
enable. 
Given the pervasive and essential presence of language in human life, and given 
the very nature of language itself (of which more below), it follows that notions of 
stable identity and development are unsettled. Thus, to the extent that educational theory 
has grounded itself in the ideas of developmental psychology, in conjunction with 
learning theory understood in terms of unilinear progression, it needs to be rethought. 
But far from justifying the excessively subjective vocabularies of self-creation, this 
should lead to something more like humility in recognition of the extent to which 
language creates us. And far from being a flight from objectivity, this will be a more 
rigorous recognition of the way things are. In a very real sense we are formed by the 
words that we have available to us, and what these words are will be determined by the 
kind of upbringing we have. There is then, it is true, a culturally relative aspect to this: 
an education in French and an education in Japanese cannot be the same (though this is
emphatically not to imply that they are impermeable), and there can be no education 
that is linguistically or culturally neutral. But this, again far from collapsing into 
epistemological relativism, should lead us to a heightened sensitivity to the significance 
of cultural initiation, with the various kinds and degrees of richness that such initiations 
can put within the range of learners, and with their various forms of exclusion or 
neglect.
It is right to see poststructuralist thought as conditioned by antifoundationalism, 
but this should not occasion the assumption that certainty is thereby forfeited or that 
truth disappears. (One does not, incidentally, have to be a poststructuralist in name in 
order to take this view. Habermas’s antifoundationalism, for example, has greater 
continuity with an Enlightenment faith in reason.) Wittgenstein devoted a set of writings 
to the exposure of the confusion that surrounds, on the one hand, the hyperbolic 
assertion of certainty and, on the other, the scepticism that is expressed in reaction to 
this. The much vaunted ‘suspicion towards metanarratives’ (of which more below) is 
tantamount to a rejection of totalising explanations, including those that are 
foundationalist. Thinking of this kind is poststructuralist in the manner that it 
undermines also the comprehensive patterns or organizing ideas that are found, for 
example, in Saussure’s linguistics or Levi-Strauss’s anthropology, or for that matter in 
G. E. Moore’s metaphysics.
The above points illustrate that poststructuralism is by no means tied to the 
(critique of the) particular conditions of postmodernity, though it may be the case that 
these insights have been made more accessible by social change. There are, however, 
two concepts associated with poststructuralism that are more particularly pertinent to 
the times in which we live, and in view of their educational relevance it is appropriate to 
acknowledge these here. In the first place, there is Baudrillard’s idea of the simalacrum: 
in the commodification and image management of postmodernity, the very distinction 
between what is real and what is simulated, fictive or imaginary becomes hard to sustain
—a process exacerbated by the new technologies with their capacity to create virtual 
reality (see Baudrillard, 1983). The other is to be found in a coinage that aptly captures 
aspects of the contemporary world and that manifests a prescience in relation to the 
changes that education policy and practice have undergone in the twenty-five years that 
have followed its introduction: Lyotard’s concept of performativity. In the light of the 
excesses of ‘quality’ control and accountability, of obsessive demonstration of 
‘efficiency and effectiveness’, and of the pervasive effects of ICT, Lyotard’s explanation 
of this idea seems particularly apt: ‘The true goal of the system, the reason it programs 
itself like a computer is the optimization of the global relationship between input and 
output: performativity’ (Lyotard, 1984, p. 11). By no means his best philosophical book, 
The postmodern condition: a report on knowledge has been widely influential amongst 
educational researchers. It is lamentable, however, that many who have read it have 
failed to respond to its dark, sardonic tone and so have missed its frequent adoption of 
phrasings that express the very ideas it seeks to expose and warn against.
I mentioned earlier the eroded boundary between philosophy and literature. This 
carries with it the recognition that there is no purely philosophical or logical prose free 
from rhetorical effects; it may be a schooled insensitivity in reading that leads us to 
think that there is. There is a parallel problem amongst educational researchers who 
imagine that they are writing scientific research reports and that their language is 
somehow ‘neutral’ and ‘objective’. The failure to read Lyotard correctly, identified here, 
is perhaps but one symptom of a general weakness in reading. If we ask ‘Why has so 
much of the point of poststructuralism been missed in education? Why have the 
misunderstandings identified above developed?’, the answer may be that readers have 
been hasty to slot these ideas into the ready-made categories of 1970s sociology of 
knowledge, of neo-Marxist exposures of the operation of power or of various versions 
of the politics of difference.
If so-called ‘postmodern’ educational research gets some of these matters wrong, 
how might this be done better? I shall try to do this by drawing out two dominant 
strands of thought. The first of these, which I shall thematize as the ‘negative’ strand, is 
to be associated especially with the influence on poststructuralism of Emmanuel 
Levinas; the second, ‘affirmative’ strand derives especially from Nietzsche. To speak of 
negativity and affirmation is not to imply a polarity. Both ways of thinking are of 
immense value for education.
Alterity and negativity
The relation to the other, or alterity, has come to be used too loosely in educational 
theory and practice. How can the idea be refined and given greater import? Once again, 
our starting point here should be language itself.
Derrida’s early work is known especially for its critique of Saussure’s account 
of the logic of the sign. Drawing heavily on ideas from Levinas, Derrida reveals the 
ways in which any utterance, any sign, is characterised by dissemination, iterability and 
the structure of the trace. Dissemination refers to the fact that any particular usage of a 
word requires its being available to circumstances that are beyond the control of the 
person who speaks or writes. Words are iterable in the sense that any expression is 
logically available to repetition: words cannot occur uniquely in the way that an object 
or an event in the world can; their repeatability is essential. Socrates (in the Phaedrus) 
worried about the fact that words that were put down in writing were vulnerable to 
being severed from their author, and hence of falling into the wrong hands, whereas the 
presence of the speaker when words were uttered ensured that they were under control. 
But Derrida shows that the control that is presumed here is illusory to the extent that 
spoken words are themselves inevitably open to interpretation and repetition by those 
who hear them, in a manner that makes them by no means secure: in fact, words could 
not be otherwise. Ironically, spoken words have the characteristic of writing that 
Socrates fears. This is not, however, to despair at lack of control or certainty. On the 
contrary, this essential aspect of our words invites the humble recognition that we are 
part of meanings that go beyond ourselves: our words mean more than we can say, say 
more than we can mean. This is the condition of thought. The sense of our dependence 
on language is increased when it is recognized that the very words that give us out 
thoughts—that are the unavoidable medium of those thoughts—come to us from former 
usages that we cannot possibly know. This is a condition of there being language at all. 
Hence words are like traces of something that has gone before but to which we can 
never return. Our thinking, our identity, is traced in ways other to us, profoundly 
compromising and complicating ideas of self-knowledge and self-mastery. But to the 
extent that meaning is enhanced by what cannot be known—by the recognition of the 
necessary limits of our language and thought, and of the way that our selves are 
structured by these—this is an enriching negativity. The humility this warrants stands in 
stark contrast to the egocentric assumptions made in constructivist and narrative 
educational research.
Let us turn to another aspect of the negative. In various later writings, in The 
Inhuman: Reflections on Time, for example, Lyotard (1991) ponders some of the ethical 
consequences of the tendency to override limits. One problem, he suggests, is that the 
contemporary world has inclined us towards a programming of our lives. The challenge 
that is presented today by processes of complexification seems to demand ever more 
extensive programmes of response. But human lives and practices must be understood 
less as programmes of action than as projects, with the open-endedness that the latter 
implies. The danger is that the programmatic orientation of thought produces a 
neutralization of ‘the unforeseeable effects engendered by the contingency and freedom 
proper to the human project’ (Lyotard, 1991, p. 69). A related tendency is also evident in 
the prevalence of rights-talk, so much a feature of contemporary conceptions of morality 
and politics. Lyotard’s Postmodern Fables (Lyotard, 1997) presents a dystopian vision of 
a world in which the right to speak—in effect, the obligation to ‘express oneself’—
becomes inflated and domineering, suppressing forms of silence and withdrawal, and, 
with disastrous consequences, inhibiting sensitivities to what cannot be said. These are 
consequences that take away the very meanings that give rights their point: ‘The human 
right to separation, which governs our declared rights, is thus violated’ (Lyotard, 1997, p. 
118). In the surreptitious, reductive incursions into the private that such ways of thinking 
effect, there is a kind of commandeering of the whole field of experience, the whole of 
ethics: everything is presumed to have a kind of ‘self-evidence, as infallible as a 
totalitarian disposition can be. Infallible as for the ruin of self-containment’ (p. 119). The 
undermining of the private realm is, furthermore, not a simple expansion of the public 
realm but rather its distortion, for what is expressed publicly should have its point and 
focus in relation to what is withheld.
As has been indicated, this negative strand of poststructuralist thought has its most 
powerful inspiration in the philosophy of Levinas, which in turn is profoundly 
influenced by Jewish thought. Crucial to the work of Levinas is the ethical distinction 
between the relation to others and the relation to the Other. The latter is usually given an 
initial capital to indicate an absolute relation to the other person, independent of 
particular characteristics, of factors that might differentiate this person from that person. 
Of course, there are ethical questions that relate to such differentiating factors—
questions of social justice (say, to do with race or disability or the distribution of wealth 
between social classes), of obligations relating to specific roles or situations, and so on. 
But these operate on what might be thought of as a horizontal axis. They are quasi-
contractual in nature. One can discharge one’s obligations, satisfy needs, settle one’s 
debts, etc., in a kind of closed economy—an economy that can be totalized or regarded 
comprehensively. Such an economy is inevitably and desirably a part of our ordinary 
lives, but it can also encroach on them too much and take on distorted forms. It is 
possible, then, that the parent who pays for the good school, buys clothing of decent 
quality, and provides nourishing food, may feel that she has fully discharged her 
obligations; that the citizen who has paid her taxes, voted and never broken the law may 
be satisfied that she has acquitted herself in a responsible way; that the teacher whose 
class has met their learning objectives may go home content that she has done her job 
efficiently and effectively. But we can imagine also that each of these might become 
moral grotesques, whose characteristic vice is perhaps hubris. Is there not something 
virtuous about the parent (the citizen, the teacher, the lover…) who feels that she has 
never done enough, who has some sense of the infinite possibilities of her relation to the 
other. Is not the person who does not see things like this in danger of getting the whole 
thing wrong—and missing the point of citizenship, parenthood, love or education? Is 
there not something morally repugnant about the parent who thinks she has done 
enough? Recognizing this opens the way perhaps to thinking of this absolute relation to 
the Other.
Two points of difference from Martin Buber’s I-thou relation may help Levinas’s 
Other come more clearly into view. In the first place, the relation is not symmetrical. 
The first person usage, as both Kierkegaard and Wittgenstein had both earlier 
emphasised, is crucial in ethics, such that ‘I am responsible to you’ is not to be 
understood to imply an equivalent responsibility on your part or on his or hers. The 
relation is something that singularises me: my absolute obligation to the Other is not 
something that I can pass up or pass on. It is to something that I must see as infinitely 
high, but also vulnerable and in need – as confronting me with an obligation that, 
paradoxically, deepens the more I answer to it. Levinas quotes words of Dostoevsky: 
‘Everyone is guilty before everyone, for everyone, and I more than the others’ (Levinas, 
1998, p. 146). This breaks loose, it should be clear, from any economy of satisfaction. 
Second, the relation is not one of cognition, and hence not one of recognition. The Other 
comes to me as having depths that I cannot know, and in order not to do violence I must 
acknowledge this unknowability. This negativity is at the heart of things. It is the ethical 
relation par excellence. In contrast to the totalities or closed economies of the horizontal 
axis, this (vertical) axis points to infinity. Of critical importance, for Levinas, is the fact 
that, if this fundamental relation to the Other is overridden, the relations to others on the 
horizontal plane will also be corrupted. Quasi-contractual obligations etc. are not 
understood correctly if the economies within which they operate are not ultimately 
given their sense by the different terms of this infinite relation—hence the poverty of 
the self-satisfied citizen, parent, teacher or lover.
Levinas’s writings constitute a sustained attempt to show the primacy of ethics 
over ontology: that is, that the efforts of philosophers (and others) through the ages have 
tended to go astray as a result of their preoccupation with stating what is the case (Is 
this a table? Are there other minds? What is the condition of man in a state of nature?). 
Such is the pervasiveness of the infinite relation to the Other that the very conditions of 
these ontological approaches are revealed to be metaphysically unsound. This is a 
challenge not only to positivistic ways of thinking—especially those that take there to 
be priority of fact over value—but also, for example, to the very different and ethically 
rich enquiries of Heidegger into being itself.
Levinas expresses these ideas in a philosophical idiom that runs together abstract 
argument with examples of remarkable immediacy and perspicuity, in which appear 
such quasi-Biblical figures as the widow, the orphan and the stranger. His thinking has 
been likened—contentiously, to be sure—to a kind of negative theology. Certainly 
Derrida’s writings of the 1990s, which constitute more direct engagements with 
Levinas, are increasingly religious in character and bear something of this negativity. 
His On the Name (Derrida, 1995), for example, includes a reading of the poem Der 
unerkandte Gott (The unknowable God) by the seventeenth century German Protestant 
mystic Angelus Silesius, while extensive discussions have related to the religiously 
resonant themes of hospitality, the gift and friendship. In Lyotard’s work of the 1980s 
also, a related negativity becomes apparent in his treatment of the immemorial—
supreme examples of which are, first, the suffering of the holocaust, memorialization of 
which inevitably reduces and distorts, and second, childhood itself, which is recollected 
by the adult only on pain of a kind of anthropomorphism. Once again it is the tendency 
to override this negativity—the forgetting of this forgetting—that constitutes the grave 
threat to our ethical lives.
The account of this negative strand of postmodern thought should serve to 
illustrate its remoteness from the misleading assumptions sketched at the start of 
Section Three. What now of poststructuralism’s affirmative strand? Here we turn again 
to Nietzsche.
Affirmation
It was said above that postmodern educational theorizing tends towards nihilism. There 
is a popular view of Nietzsche that takes it that, with the ‘death of God’, this was his 
manifesto. This is to turn Nietzsche upside down.
Nietzsche’s sustained preoccupation with nihilism can be understood, as Deleuze 
(1983) has shown, through the identification of three kinds. Thus, negative nihilism 
characterizes the kind of denial of this world that is found in (certain forms of) 
Christianity. Although he represents Jesus at times as a formidable adversary, he regards 
this denial of life as a contemptible weakening of the human spirit. A second kind is 
reactive nihilism, typified by the stance of the rebel. This also Nietzsche condemns on 
the grounds that the rebel is too dependent on the very thing that is opposed. Hence he 
too is understood in terms of negation. Finally, there is passive nihilism, the position of 
the person who lives comfortably, who perhaps opts for a risk-free life of tranquillity, 
comfort and prosperity, with its conventional tokens of success—typically the life of the 
bourgeois. Such a life, Nietzsche believes, represents a last stage in the draining of the 
human spirit. As must be clear then, Nietzsche speaks of nihilism as something to which 
he is vehemently opposed. But what is also clear is that for Nietzsche there can be no 
ready-made values. Such established or received values devalue themselves. Indeed, 
God has ‘died’ because he has devalued himself in becoming assimilated to the 
conventions and satisfactions of respectable bourgeois life. What is needed instead is a 
‘transvaluation’ of values, in favour of standards that one takes up as one’s own. 
Nietzsche’ work as a whole is committed to showing how this might be done.
In the process Nietzsche laments the ways in which, in a culture that has divested 
itself of the sustaining myths of earlier generations (with their implicit 
acknowledgement of the limits of knowledge), and where all is subjected to a kind of 
abstract reason (the blame for which he attaches to a certain image of the thinking of 
Socrates), education itself is drained of life:
The images of myth must be the demoniac guardians, omnipresent and 
unnoticed, which protect the growth of the young mind, and guide man’s 
interpretation of his life and struggles. The state itself has no unwritten laws 
more powerful than the mythical foundation that guarantees its connection 
with religion and its growth out of mythical representations. Let us now, by 
way of comparison, imagine abstract man, without the guidance of myth—
abstract education, abstract morality, abstract justice, the abstract state; let us 
imagine the lawless wandering, unchecked by native myth, of the artistic 
imagination; let us imagine a culture without a secure and sacred primal site, 
condemned to exhaust every possibility and feed wretchedly on all other 
cultures—there we have our present age, the product of that Socratism bent on 
the destruction of myth (Nietzsche, 1993, pp. 109–10).
Elsewhere, Nietzsche associates this weakness with a certain foundationalist fallacy of 
psychological explanation that he caricatures contemptuously: 
To trace something unknown back to something known is alleviating, 
soothing, gratifying and gives moreover a feeling of power. Danger, disquiet, 
anxiety attend the unknown – the first instinct is to eliminate these distressing 
states. First principle: any explanation is better than none (Nietzsche, 1962, 
‘The Four Great Errors’: p. 62, #5).
Nietzsche criticises the culture that confronts him, but his purpose is not 
destructive. He warns against the ressentiment that can so deplete the spirit and so 
detract from the living of life in its fullness, and that contributes so much to our petty 
meanness in our daily lives. Ressentiment refers to the negativity of looking back, 
whether with nostalgia or with regret or remorse, or of looking forward obsessively 
such that the present disappears in wishful thinking for a future that never arrives. The 
affirmation of life that contrasts with this is sometimes amplified in Nietzsche by 
reference to states of intoxication or of the dance. These are states not of self-conscious 
assertiveness but rather of losing oneself in absorption in what one is doing, of divesting 
oneself of one’s burdensome ego. It is not that this absorption can take only intoxicated 
forms: the involvement of an artist in her work, of an engineer in solving a problem, of 
a student in writing an essay or a teacher with her subject, might all be examples of this 
intensity. Indeed the teacher’s role might be seen as ‘a conductor of intensity’, as of an 
electric current that passes through subject matter, teacher and students. Such absorption 
is a condition for a culture’s vitality and value, and for the education that sustains it.
Nietzsche has been a major influence on the work of Foucault (see, for example, 
Peters and Wain, 2003), but the themes of affirmation that have been adumbrated here 
are more evident in the work of Deleuze and in the middle phase of Lyotard. It is here 
especially that we can find pointers towards a revitalized educational practice (see, for 
example, Bearn, 2000; Blake et al., 2000, ch. 7; Williams, 2000). But it is time to extend 
these remarks in order to ask what other developments might be supported by these 
negative and affirmative strands of postructuralism.
How might education be changed by these thoughts?
To begin with, there is an important job to be done in terms of dismantling the 
oppressive and totalizing structures that have come to dominate educational practice in 
many countries. On the face of it, ‘oppressive’ and ‘totalizing’ appear more or less 
conventional political terms. What is at issue here is much more a matter of the 
colonizing of thought by performativity. The consequences of this colonization are that 
we are progressively disabled from thinking in certain ways—ways that are vital to 
education, as they are to the pursuit of truth itself. But beyond this dismantling, what 
further recommendations can be identified?
First, there are implications for the curriculum and assessment. The negative 
strand points to the fact that the substance of what is taught needs to be planned and 
presented to students in such a way as both to avoid any suggestion of comprehensive 
coverage and to indicate infinite possibilities. Thus, elementary arithmetic is not only of 
transactional usefulness but opens onto the whole of the calculus. One does not teach 
history with a view only to meeting examination criteria but with a sense of the intrinsic 
fascination, and through demonstrating the way the field opens the more it is pursued. 
Of course, examinations and their criteria can be designed so that they sensitively reflect 
this, and so that they do not dominate everything that goes on in the course of 
instruction. But plainly, under the influence of mistaken notions of objectivity, rigour 
and accountability, the trend is commonly against this.
It follows, second, that the selection of topics and texts to be studied should be 
such that they are resistant to a univocal reading. In other words, the content that is 
presented to students should not be something that they are merely to take in and 
regurgitate, or that they imagine they understand comprehensively; neither should it be 
deemed incidental and merely the vehicle for skills-acquisition (even if these are 
‘critical skills’). Curriculum content needs to be such that it opens onto questions—
questions that are sometimes intractable or disturbing and with which the teacher is seen 
to be engaged (with fascination, puzzlement, with a struggle perhaps). The purchase of 
these remarks obviously depends on the stage of education: they seem more obviously 
applicable in the university than the infants’ school. But even in the latter it is possible 
to adopt approaches that are orientated in this way, and in any case whatever goes on at 
this stage should be bracketed by these larger aspirations for education as a whole.
As a third point, the ethical implications of poststructuralism are such that moral 
education or citizenship education will cease to be the province of a particular aspect of 
the curriculum, for virtually everything will be understood in these terms. It is perhaps 
not too much of an exaggeration to say that all education is moral education, all 
education is citizenship education – for if morality and citizenship are taken with 
sufficient seriousness, they can be seen to extend across one’s life as a whole. This is 
not to legitimate ‘cross-curricular themes’: it is that the point of education as a whole 
cannot be considered in isolation from these matters.
The broad significance of the ethical also has a bearing upon the way in which 
educational research is undertaken and understood. While at present the ‘ethics of 
educational research’ tends to be understood in terms of the problems to which the 
codes of practice are addressed, it is the value of what is taught and learned (and how 
this is done) that should be at the heart of research. The prevailing empiricism of 
research practice is revealed as all the more inadequate.
A fourth point leads us to consider more directly the visions of good practice that 
these strands of poststructuralism prompt. In contrast to the idea of the teacher with her 
portfolio of skills, the good teacher is likely to be someone who sees herself as in 
service of her subject, of goods towards which she seeks to lead the learner. The 
curriculum is a mode of the relation to the Other. Once again there must be some strong 
sense that what is to be learned is not merely incidental. Of course, there may be facets 
of the curriculum—say, word-processing skills—that are to be seen in an instrumental 
way, but these will need ultimately to be subsumed within a larger sense of value. It 
follows also that the idea of the teacher as facilitator, at best providing the students with 
the ability to learn-how-to-learn, is an abnegation of what the teacher should be about.
If there are suggestions of traditionalism in what is said here, this is not entirely to 
be resisted. But it needs to be remembered that any academic tradition worth its name is 
far from settled in its procedures and preoccupations. Although it is likely to be 
assembled around the reading of certain texts and sets of problems, these will not be 
static. They will characteristically be open to rival readings and critical disputes, marked 
by divergences between paradigms. A tradition will also have its own avant-garde. Such 
is the very life of a tradition and something of this should bear upon education as a 
whole, its presence increasingly evident as learning progresses. Friction between 
perspectives can spark the intensity of involvement mentioned above.
Poststructuralism will not yield any tidy rules for good practice that teachers are 
simply to learn. There are no recipes for being a conductor of intensity. But this is not to 
say that nothing can be done. Teacher education needs to be divested of bad ideas of 
effective performance (sometimes dignified as ‘professionalism’); teachers can be made 
aware of some of what is said here (of the potential openness of what is studied, of the 
value of intense absorption), and they can be led to experience these themselves; they 
can be inspired examples of good practice; they can be encouraged, with careful 
guidance, to develop sensitivities and skills relevant to the rhythms of teaching—to 
understand, like good comedians, the importance of timing, to pace the class and create 
the space for response; they can learn when to intervene and when to hold back, when to 
be direct and when indirect. The possibilities for a revised teacher education here are 
rich enough. There is correlative scope for a rethinking of educational research.
Having, illustrated, in this long third part of this discussion, something of the 
importance for these strands of poststructuralism, I return, in the final section, to the 
geography of Europe in order to say something about the institutionalization of 
philosophy of education there and the presence of the kind of thinking considered 
above.
Contemporary philosophy of education in Europe
The contemporary institutionalization of philosophy of education in Europe is the 
product of three main factors: political factors (from the pressures of performativity to 
the fall of the Berlin Wall), the robustness of indigenous traditions and the hegemony of 
the English language. Inevitably the lingua franca of most conferences is English. 
While there is a significant body of work in Spanish and the Scandinavian languages, it 
is only really the German tradition that has maintained independence in the face of this 
dominance. Hence, those in the field almost inevitably find their work drawn into these 
channels of publications, the preponderance, of course, being in English.
British analytical philosophy of education, the form that is most commonly 
identified, rightly or wrongly, with Anglophone traditions in Europe, tends to describe 
itself in terms of a history that is relatively recent, spanning the past forty years. In 
contrast, the German tradition has an illustrious and long background. (Both Kant and 
Hegel were required to teach courses on education.) Its approach in recent decades has 
continued to pay reverence to that background, with articles typically beginning with a 
delineation of the heritage of thinking that leads to the consideration of the topic at 
hand. While German philosophical thinking about education has had considerable 
influence in Japan, its most obvious influences within Europe have perhaps been in the 
Scandinavian countries, where strong indigenous traditions of philosophical enquiry 
into education have interacted fruitfully with developments in both the UK and 
Germany. Bildung is, of course, a sustained theme of this work (see, for example, 
Loevlie et al., 2002). While the Anglophone and German traditions have tended to pass 
one another by, there has recently been a new will, through conferences and 
publications, to bridge this divide. The European Educational Research Association has 
its Philosophy of Education Network in which the coming together of these traditions 
has been evident, and other conferences have also fostered this. Another recent venture 
has brought these traditions together in order to examine the idea and role of critique in 
democracy and education in the decades since the Second World War (Heyting and 
Winch, 2004).
The enormous influence of Gadamer and Habermas, and the growing importance 
of Luhmann, indicate ways in which German traditions extend beyond 
poststructuralism. Conversely, if one turns to the country that is most obviously 
poststructuralism’s provenance, France, philosophy of education is noticeable by its 
absence—though there has been growing interest in recent years. The main reason for 
this is the nature of French policy for education and the preparation of teachers. (In 
other countries also, of course, the numbers of people in the field have been drastically 
affected by such policy factors.) This has not prevented French poststructuralist thought 
from having extensive influence on philosophy of education, in Europe and around the 
world, just as traditions from other countries have done. I do not claim that those who 
are working with these ideas will necessarily recognize what they are doing in the terms 
I have presented in the previous section.
These brief comments underline once again the problematic nature of any 
comparative account that takes Europe as its starting point. While Europe must in a 
sense be seen as the place that exports ‘the philosophy of education’ to the rest of the 
world, there is more than a danger here of a one-sided story being told—not to mention 
one-sided stories within that story. I shall not at this stage indicate the connections and 
distinctions, the multiple influences and cross-fertilizations, that a better account would 
need to cover, except to register one apparent and somewhat ironic repression—the 
influence, mentioned so far only in passing, of North America. Surely no account of 
philosophy of education in Europe can be given without acknowledgement of the major 
importance of John Dewey, of the background of pragmatism before him, and of other 
aspects of American thought. But that clearly requires another paper, and a further 
puzzle about where to begin.
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